The analysis and resolution of environmental conflicts

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Introduction

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$\Rightarrow$Title of the Thesis: "Methods and Models for Environmental Conflicts Analysis ad Resolutions", Tutor: Professor Giorgio Gallo.

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The Thesis is a "Work in progress" ⟵ Open Issues.

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Basic framework: collaborative shared decisions and commitments.

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Analysis of *SD* as a tool and a meta-tool.

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The use of auctions for the allocations of chores ("bads")

(1) Dutch auction with negative prices: the auctioneer proposes a chore and an increasing amount ($\leq M$) of money until when one of bidders calls stop and accept the chore.
(2) English auction with negative prices: the auctioneer proposes a chore and a starting amount of money L to the bidders that start bidding lower and lower amounts of money until one of them stops the descent and gets the chore.
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Level of "maturity": $(3) \succ (1) \succ (2)$.

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No numerary good, no common scale, both goods and bads, independence or additivity

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Analysis of **Co-operative Game Theory** and **Non CGT** within the following framework:

initial_set_up;
while(*problem_exists*)
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  coalitions_interaction; \\NCGT
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